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OVERCOMING OBSTACLES TO WORKER REPRESENTATION:
INSIGHTS FROM THE TEMPORARY AGENCY WORKFORCE
DANIELLE D. VAN JAARSVELD*
I. INTRODUCTION
The proliferation of contingent employment arrangements, in
which workers “do not have an implicit or explicit contract for
ongoing employment,”1 in the past decade is well documented.2
Firms in the United States use contingent workers, including tem-
porary agency workers,3 for several reasons.  The most common
reasons employers cite for their use include enhancing labor flexi-
bility to address changes in demand; covering for absences; and re-
ducing costs associated with the hiring, training, and compensation
* Assistant Professor of Organizational Behaviour and Human Resources, Uni-
versity of British Columbia, Sauder School of Business, A.B. 1995 Princeton University;
M.S. 2000, Ph.D. 2004, Cornell University.  The author thanks Lee H. Adler, Senior
Extension Associate, Cornell University ILR, for helpful suggestions and comments.
1. Debate about the definition of contingent employment arrangement has
yielded variation in estimates about the size of the contingent workforce in the United
States.  While most definitions of “contingent” include temporary (agency and direct-
hired) and on-call workers, whether or not part-timers and independent contractors
should also be considered “contingent workers” is a matter of debate.  The U.S. Depart-
ment of Labor’s Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) collects data on contingent work with
supplements to the Current Population Survey and defines contingent work as workers
who do not have an expectation of continuing employment, and based on that defini-
tion, estimates that 5.7 million workers are in contingent employment arrangements,
representing about 4% of total employment. U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR
STATISTICS, CONTINGENT AND ALTERNATIVE EMPLOYMENT ARRANGEMENTS, FEBRUARY 2005
3 (July 27, 2005), available at http://www.bls.gov/news.release/conemp.nr0.htm [here-
inafter BLS, CONTINGENT ARRANGEMENTS]; see also Richard S. Belous, The Rise of the Con-
tingent Workforce: The Key Challenges and Opportunities, 52 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 863, 868
(1995); Sharon R. Cohany, Workers in Alternative Employment Arrangements: A Second Look,
121 MONTHLY LAB. REV. 3 (1998); Katherine M. Forster, Strategic Reform of Contingent
Work, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 541 (2001); Susan N. Houseman, Why Employers Use Flexible
Staffing Arrangements: Evidence from an Establishment Survey, 55 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV.
149 (2001).
2. BLS, CONTINGENT ARRANGEMENTS, supra note 1; Cohany, supra note 1; Forster, R
supra note 1; Belous, supra note 1.
3. The term “temporary agency worker” refers to an employment arrangement
that involves a temporary employment agency.  Independent contractor arrangements
are also a type of contingent employment.
355
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of permanent employees.4  From the perspective of the workforce,
some benefits of contingent work arrangements include flexibility
in the choice of when to work and in the type of assignments to
take on, and the opportunity to have some control over one’s ca-
reer.5  These benefits, however, can be outweighed by the signifi-
cant disadvantages that stem from the absence of a long-term
attachment to a firm, which in turn can translate into reduced ac-
cess to health and pension benefits, fewer opportunities for firm-
subsidized training, lower wages, and a lack of job security.  Moreo-
ver, the presence of a temporary staffing agency in the employment
relationship complicates a temporary agency worker’s access to pro-
tections available through the National Labor Relations Act
(NLRA).6  As a result, these workers can be left without a voice to
represent them in negotiations with their employers.
In March 1998, a group of dissatisfied high-tech7 contingent
workers at Microsoft Corp. formed an advocacy organization, the
Washington Alliance of Technology Workers/Communication
Workers of America (WashTech/CWA), to improve their working
conditions.  WashTech/CWA successfully pursued non-traditional
methods of organizing this workforce, which suggests a possible di-
4. W. GILMORE MCKIE & LAURENCE LIPSETT, THE CONTINGENT WORKER: A HUMAN
RESOURCES PERSPECTIVE (1995); Houseman, supra note 1.  Many scholars use the term R
“full-time” employee to refer to non-contingent employees.  However, the National La-
bor Relations Board uses the term “permanent” employee to refer to non-contingent
employees. See Church Homes, Inc., 343 N.L.R.B. 128 (2004).  Although all employ-
ment in the United States is considered “at-will,” and therefore no employment is truly
permanent, the term is used to indicate an understanding that the employer and em-
ployee intend the employment to be for a steady job, rather than a temporary or casual
one.  4 LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW § 130.02 (Matthew Bender & Co. 2005).  This
article will refer to non-contingent employees as “permanent” employees, rather than
“full-time” employees, out of recognition of the fact that contingent employees often
work full-time as well as over-time hours.
5. Stephen R. Barley et al., Why Do Contractors Contract? The Experience Of Highly
Skilled Technical Professionals in a Contingent Labor Market, 55 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 234
(2002); Forster, supra note 1; Rick Melchionno, The Changing Temporary Work Force: Man-
agerial, Professional, and Technical Workers in the Personnel Supply Services Industry, OCCUPA-
TIONAL OUTLOOK Q., Mar. 22, 1999, at 24.
6. Forster, supra note 1, at 541.
7. For purposes of this paper, “high-tech” refers to the “design, development,
and introduction of new products and innovative manufacturing processes, or both,
through the systematic application of scientific and technical knowledge.”  Daniel
Hecker, High-technology Employment: A Broader View, 122 MONTHLY LAB. REV., June 1999,
at 18.
\\server05\productn\N\NLR\50-2\NLR214.txt unknown Seq: 3 14-APR-06 7:56
2005-2006] INSIGHTS FROM THE TEMPORARY AGENCY WORKFORCE 357
rection for similar organizing efforts in other industries that de-
pend on contingent workers.
Part II of this article reviews the legal obstacles that temporary
agency workers encounter in trying to gain representation under
current labor law.  Part III examines Microsoft and its contingent
employment arrangements as an illustration of the relationship be-
tween temporary agency workers, the temporary employment
agency, and the client firm,8 and addresses the implications of such
employment arrangements for contingent workers.  Part IV ana-
lyzes the formation and growth of WashTech/CWA and the strate-
gies it uses to represent temporary workers in order to gain insight
into the future of contingent workforce representation.  Finally,
Part V concludes by arguing that in the absence of further legal
reform, organizations such as WashTech/CWA are not only neces-
sary to protect contingent workers, but will also become increas-
ingly important in the next-wave labor movement generally.9
II. THE LABOR LAW CONTEXT
Private-sector labor law in the United States reflects the tradi-
tional New Deal definition of “employee,” which presumes a long-
term attachment to a firm.10  Temporary agency workers fall
outside of the NLRA definition of employee in two primary ways.
First, temporary agency workers generally lack a long-term relation-
8. The term “client firm” refers to the employer that obtains workers from a
temporary employment agency.
9. This article draws on three primary sources of information to consider strate-
gies that are suitable for the representation of high-tech contingent workers: interviews,
Internet-based information, and survey data. See Danielle D. van Jaarsveld, Collective Rep-
resentation Among High-Tech Workers at Microsoft and Beyond: Lessons from Wash Tech/CWA,
43 INDUS. REL. 364, 365-66 (2004).
10. The NLRA, a key component of the private-sector collective bargaining sys-
tem, is consistent with this approach.  Although the NLRA does not expressly define
“employee,” it does so implicitly by defining instead the types of workers who are not
considered employees under the Act and includes independent contractors among
them. See 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (2000). See also Annette Bernhardt & Thomas Bailey,
Improving Worker Welfare in the Age of Flexibility, 41 CHALLENGE 16 (1998); Francoise J.
Carre´ et al., Representing the Part-Time and Contingent Workforce: Challenges for Unions and
Public Policy, in RESTORING THE PROMISE OF AMERICAN LABOR LAW 314 (Sheldon Fried-
man et al. eds., 1994) [hereinafter RESTORING THE PROMISE]; Stewart Schwab, The Diver-
sity of Contingent Workers and the Need for Nuanced Policy, 52 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 915
(1995).
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ship with an employer at a single worksite.  Second, the involve-
ment of the temporary staffing agency as a labor-market
intermediary in the employment relationship between a temporary
worker and a client firm further complicates the situation by creat-
ing a triangular employment relationship that is inconsistent with
the traditional NLRA model.11  For example, temporary agency
workers can form a bargaining unit and enter into a bargaining
relationship with their temporary employment agency12  However,
given the nature of temporary work, and that a temporary agency
generally includes workers who may experience very different em-
ployment conditions based on the client firm where their work is
located, this option is unrealistic.  A client firm can also terminate
its relationship with a temporary employment agency and do so
without repercussions.13  Thus, a client firm could potentially avoid
an organizing drive of temporary workers by simply severing its rela-
tionship with the temporary employment agency.14  The client firm
can do so without punishment so long as the client firm does not
inform workers or the temporary employment agency of the reason
for termination if it is related to the organizing drive.15  While the
NLRA does not prohibit temporary agency workers from organizing
and bargaining collectively, these workers in practice nevertheless
face a number of obstacles in gaining representation and encoun-
ter significant difficulties accessing these remedies under labor and
employment laws such as the NLRA.16  Temporary agency workers
therefore have limited access to collective bargaining, which is an
important channel through which workers generally challenge as-
11. See George Gonos, Fee-splitting Revisited: Concealing Surplus Value in the Temporary
Employment Relationship, 29 POL. & SOC’Y 589 (2001).
12. See, e.g., All-work, Inc., 193 N.L.R.B. 910, 919 (1971); see Bita Rahebi, Rethink-
ing the National Labor Relations Board Treatment of Temporary Workers: Granting Access to
Unionization, 47 UCLA L. REV. 1105 (2000); Robert B. Moberly, Temporary, Part Time,
and Other Atypical Employment Relationships in the United States, 38 LAB. L.J. 689 (1987).
13. See Craig Becker, Labor Law Outside the Employment Relation, 74 TEX. L. REV.
1527, 1548-49 (1996).
14. See id.; Rahebi, supra note 12.
15. See id.
16. See Mark Berger, The Contingent Employee Benefits Problem, 32 IND. L. REV. 301
(1999); RESTORING THE PROMISE, supra note 10; H. Lane Dennard, Jr. & Herbert R.
Northrup, Leased Employment: Character, Numbers, and Labor Law Problems, 28 GA. L. REV.
683 (1994); Schwab, supra note 10; Eileen Silverstein & Peter Goselin, Intentionally Im- R
permanent Employment and the Paradox of Productivity, 26 STETSON L. REV. 1 (1996).
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pects of their working conditions.17  While it is true that a few tem-
porary agencies in the United States have collective bargaining
agreements, these agencies are exceptions to the rule.18
A. Legal Requirements for Obtaining Representation
In circumstances when temporary agency workers seek to gain
collective representation under the NLRA and negotiate with the
temporary agency and the client firm, a series of legal requirements
must be satisfied.  These requirements differ based on whether the
temporary workers seek to form their own bargaining unit, com-
prised solely of temporary workers, or whether they seek to join an
existing bargaining unit comprised of the client firm’s permanent
employees.  The legal analysis for each of these situations will be
discussed in turn.
1. Requirements for Temporary Workers Seeking to
Form a Bargaining Unit
In order for temporary workers to organize and form a collec-
tive bargaining unit comprised only of temporary workers, the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board (NLRB) must find that two elements
are satisfied: 1) a community of interest exists among the tempo-
rary workers themselves; and 2) the client firm and the temporary
employment agency are joint employers.
First, the NLRB must find that the temporary workers seeking
to form the bargaining unit share a sufficient “community of inter-
est.”19  To establish that a community of interest exists, temporary
17. See Jennifer Middleton, Contingent Workers in a Changing Economy: Endure,
Adapt, or Organize?, 22 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 557 (1996); Rahebi, supra note 12.
18. The fact that union representation for such workers is not readily accessible
explains, in part, why union representation of temporary agency workers is limited. See
Moberly, supra note 12; Rahebi, supra note 12.
19. Section 9(b) of the NLRA requires that a bargaining unit be “appropriate” for
collective bargaining purposes and applies to all workers who wish to form a bargaining
unit, not only temporary workers wishing to form a bargaining unit.  29 U.S.C.
§ 159(b).  The determination of whether a bargaining unit is “appropriate” under the
NLRA in any situation is based on the community of interest test. See ARMCO, Inc. v.
NLRB, 832 F.2d 357, 362 (6th Cir. 1987).
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workers must demonstrate that they share similar skills, wage levels,
hours, and working conditions.20
Second, in order to avail themselves of their legal right to col-
lective bargaining representation under the NLRA, temporary
agency workers must establish that a joint employer relationship ex-
ists between the temporary staffing agency and the client firm.21
Joint employers are “independent legal entities that have merely
historically chosen to handle, jointly, important aspects of their em-
ployer-employee relationship.”22  If “two or more employers exert
significant control over [the] same employees, where from evi-
dence it can be shown that they share or codetermine those matters
governing essential terms and conditions of employment, they are
‘joint employers’ within the meaning of National Labor Relations
Act.”23  The NLRB applies the “right to control” test to determine
whether a joint employer relationship exists.24  The right to control
test evaluates who has control over the “essential terms and condi-
tions of employment” such as hiring, firing, discipline, supervision,
and control of employees.25  The central factor influencing
whether or not the NLRB will recognize a client firm and a tempo-
rary employment agency as joint employers is who has control over
the “means and manner of the worker’s performance.”26  This de-
termination involves more than the mere appearance of supervi-
sion; there must be a showing that each employer has significant
involvement in the terms and conditions of employment.27  Upon a
finding of a joint employer relationship, the client firm is obligated
20. See Kalamazoo Paper Box Corp., 136 N.L.R.B. 134 (1962); Rahebi, supra note
12.
21. See NLRB v. Browning-Ferris Indus. of Pa., Inc., 691 F.2d 1117 (3d Cir. 1982).
See also Jonathan P. Hiatt & Lynn Rhinehart, The Growing Contingent Workforce: A Chal-
lenge for the Future, Paper Presented to the American Bar Association, Section of Labor
and Employment Law (Aug. 10, 1993), reprinted in DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) No. 154, at E-
1 (Aug. 12, 1993).
22. Browning-Ferris Indus., 691 F.2d at 1122 (citing NLRB v. Checker Cab Co., 367
F.2d 692, 698 (6th Cir. 1966)).
23. Id. at 1124 (citing Boire v. Greyhound Corp., 376 U.S. 473 (1964)).
24. Laerco Transp. & Warehouse, 269 N.L.R.B. 324, 325-26 (1984).
25. Id.
26. Magnuson v. Peak Technical Servs., 808 F. Supp. 500, 509 (E.D. Va. 1992).  See
also Kenneth A. Jenero & Mark A. Spognardi, Temporary Employment Relationships: Review
of the Joint Employer Doctrine under the NLRA, 21 EMPL. REL. L.J. 127 (1995).
27. Laerco Transp., 269 N.L.R.B. at 325.
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to negotiate with the temporary workers’ representative.28  If, how-
ever, the NLRB finds that the two firms are not joint employers, the
client firm will not be legally required to bargain with temporary
workers.
2. Requirements for Temporary Workers Seeking to
Join an Existing Bargaining Unit Alongside
Permanent Employees
When temporary workers seek to join an existing bargaining
unit comprised not only of temporary workers, but also of the client
firm’s permanent employees, the requirements differ slightly.  The
NLRB still must find that the community of interest and joint em-
ployer relationship elements exist.  In this situation, however, an
additional requirement must be satisfied: the temporary agency and
the client firm must consent to the temporary workers’ inclusion in
the bargaining unit.29
First, the NLRB must not only find that the temporary workers
themselves share a community of interest with one another, but
must also find that the temporary workers share a community of
interest with the permanent employees who are already in the bar-
gaining unit.30  Determining whether a community of interest exists
involves consideration of the same factors discussed above — simi-
larity in skill, wage level, hours, and working conditions.31  It is,
however, unnecessary for temporary workers and permanent em-
ployees to be identical in terms of their working experience.32
Second, a joint employer relationship must exist between the
temporary agency and the client firm.  The joint employer analysis
in this situation is the same as when temporary workers seek to
form their own bargaining unit.33
The third and final element that must exist before temporary
agency workers may join an existing bargaining unit with perma-
28. See Browning-Ferris Indus., 691 F.2d 1117.
29. Lee Hospital, 300 N.L.R.B. 947 (1990).
30. See 9 U.S.C. § 159(b); sources cited supra note 21.
31. See Kalamazoo Paper Box Corp., 136 N.L.R.B. 134; Rahebi, supra note 12.
32. Ameritech Commc’ns, Inc., 297 N.L.R.B. 654, 656 (1990).
33. See discussion supra Part II.A.1.
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nent employees is the dual-consent requirement.34  The temporary
employment agency and client firm must both consent to the tem-
porary workers joining the bargaining unit.35  Therefore, even if
the NLRB finds that a community of interest among the temporary
and permanent employees exists and that the two firms are joint
employers, the door to representation does not necessarily swing
open to temporary workers.
B. Obstacles to Obtaining Representation
The right of temporary agency workers to gain representation
under the NLRA must be considered in terms of the practical impli-
cations of the legal requirements that they must satisfy in order to
exercise that right.36  The inherent nature of temporary work fails
to conform easily to the requirements of the NLRA, set forth above,
because it is characterized by multiple worksites, short-term assign-
ments, high levels of mobility, and the presence of an intermediary
in the employment relationship.37  These characteristics make it dif-
ficult for temporary agency workers to overcome the hurdles of es-
tablishing a community of interest and a joint employer
relationship, and of obtaining the consent of the employers.
Temporary agency workers who wish to join a pre-existing bar-
gaining unit will have difficulty meeting the community of interest
requirement because they often move from job to job and might be
assigned to multiple worksites.  Establishing that a joint employer
relationship exists can also be difficult because the analysis focuses
on who controls the work (in the case of temporary workers, usually
the client firm) as opposed to who controls the economic factors of
the relationship (typically the temporary staffing agency).38
34. Lee Hospital, 300 N.L.R.B. 947.  In 2000, the NLRB briefly removed the dual
consent requirement, in M.B. Sturgis, Inc., 331 N.L.R.B. 1298 (2000), only to reinstate it
in 2004.  H.S. Care L.L.C., d/b/a Oakwood Care Center, 2004 N.L.R.B. LEXIS 673
(N.L.R.B. Nov. 19, 2004).
35. H.S. Care L.L.C., 2004 N.L.R.B. LEXIS 673, at *2.  For a discussion of the pol-
icy rationale for the consent requirement, see id. at *20-*23.
36. Rahebi, supra note 12; Gonos, supra note 11.
37. RESTORING THE PROMISE, supra note 10; Hiatt & Rhinehart, supra note 21; Mid-
dleton, supra note 17; Moberly, supra note 12.
38. See Laerco Transp. & Warehouse, 269 N.L.R.B. at 325; Rahebi, supra note 12;
Hiatt & Rhinehart, supra note 21; RESTORING THE PROMISE, supra note 10.
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Further complicating the establishment of a joint employer re-
lationship is the fact that a client firm might wish to avoid being
identified as a joint employer.39  In those situations, the firm will
often either structure the relationship with the agency in a way that
avoids a joint employer relationship or sever the employment rela-
tionship altogether.  As more firms have developed close relation-
ships with temporary employment agencies, they have also begun to
carefully structure these relationships in a way that would preclude
a determination that they are joint employers under the NLRA.
Without the recognition that a joint employer relationship exists, a
client firm is also protected from union efforts to express dissatis-
faction with working conditions through economic pressure.
The characteristics of this employment relationship hamper or-
ganizing efforts and, as a result, temporary agency workers lack
clear access to some of the labor and employment protections that
permanent employees enjoy under the NLRA.40  In addition, tem-
porary workers must obtain consent from both the temporary
agency and the client firm before they may join the existing bar-
gaining unit in cases where a joint employer relationship is found
to exist.41  Because neither the agency nor the client firm is likely to
provide consent, this channel to representation is difficult to access.
Thus, temporary agency workers are in a vulnerable position in the
workplace.
III. A CASE STUDY OF HIGH-TECH TEMPORARY AGENCY
WORKERS AT MICROSOFT
A. Why Microsoft Uses Temporary Agency Workers
During the 1990s, Microsoft encountered ongoing legal diffi-
culties with its contingent workforce.  Microsoft relied on a sizable
39. See Rahebi, supra note 12 (noting that William Gould, former Chairman of the
NLRB, could not recall a case in which a client firm had not wanted to avoid a finding
of a joint employer relationship).
40. See RESTORING THE PROMISE, supra note 10; Hiatt & Rhinehart, supra note 21;
Middleton, supra note 17.  For a full review of the application of labor and employment
laws to contingent workers, see Lisa Mills, Contingent Employees Gain Access to Union Repre-
sentation: National Labor Relations Board Grants Contingent Employees the Right to Join Same
Collective Bargaining Unit as User Employer’s Regular Employees, 26 S. ILL. U. L. J. 81 (2001);
Schwab, supra note 10.
41. See H.S. Care L.L.C., 2004 N.L.R.B. LEXIS 673.
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workforce that was classified as independent contractors, a practice
that was common among many companies during the early 1990s.
At Microsoft’s request, its independent contractors signed docu-
ments whereby they explicitly agreed to be classified as such.42  In
1992, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) audited Microsoft’s em-
ployment practices and found that these individuals were in fact
common law employees.43  Based on a twenty-factor test, the IRS
determined that the degree of control and direction Microsoft ex-
ercised over these workers suggested that these workers were
Microsoft employees and that they were misclassified as indepen-
dent contractors.  Following the IRS determination, Microsoft con-
verted some of the independent contractors to permanent status
and shifted others to the payrolls of temporary employment
agencies.44
Incorporating temporary employment agencies into its staffing
strategy provided Microsoft with access to a flexible source of labor.
The use of temporary employment agencies also brought Microsoft
into compliance with IRS regulations, allowing the company to
avoid the risk that its contingent workers would again be deemed
de facto employees.45  Microsoft referred to its workers who were
hired through temporary employment agencies and assigned to
temporary positions at Microsoft as “agency contractors.”  The
agency contractors’ job assignments were concentrated in Internet
content creation,46 and the length of these assignments was not
42. Vizcaino v. Microsoft Corp., 97 F.3d 1187, 1190 (9th Cir. 1996) (discussing the
documents that the plaintiff, an independent contractor employed by Microsoft,
signed, including a document entitled “Microsoft Corporation Independent Contractor
Copyright Assignment and Non-Disclosure Agreements,” as well as several other com-
pany documents entitled “Independent Contractor/Freelancer Information”).
43. Vizcaino, 97 F.3d at 1190.  For a more detailed description of this case see infra
note 70.
44. Eight independent contractors who were transferred to temporary employ-
ment agencies as a result of the IRS audit challenged their exclusion from Microsoft’s
Savings Plus Plan and Microsoft’s Employee Stock Purchase Plan. See infra note 70 (dis-
cussing the litigation and its resolution).
45. U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, ADVISORY COUNCIL ON EMPLOYEE WELFARE AND PENSION
BENEFIT PLANS, REPORT OF THE WORKING GROUP ON THE BENEFIT IMPLICATIONS OF THE
GROWTH OF A CONTINGENT WORKFORCE (testimony by David Stoubaugh, Bendich,
Stobaugh & Strong) (Sept. 8, 1999).
46. WashTech/CWA gathered this information through the Microsoft Conversion
Survey administered by WashTech/CWA in September 1999.  Their job titles — includ-
ing 3D artists, content coordinators, graphic designers, programmers/writers, technical
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necessarily short.  In fact, many Microsoft agency contractors re-
ferred to themselves as “permatemps” because their assignments
lasted for years.  By the year 2000, approximately 35% of
Microsoft’s high-skilled workforce — a total of 6800 workers nation-
wide — consisted of agency contractors.  Roughly 5326 of those
workers were located in the Seattle area.47
B. The Triangular Relationship at Microsoft
Three actors existed in the temporary employment arrange-
ment: Microsoft, the agency contractor (or temporary agency
worker), and the temporary employment agency.  Agency contrac-
tors were hired for assignments at Microsoft in one of two ways.  In
the first scenario, a worker submitted an application with a tempo-
rary employment agency.  In response to a request from Microsoft
for applicants, a temporary employment agency forwarded informa-
tion on qualified applicants to Microsoft.  Once Microsoft selected
an applicant, the temporary employment agency began wage nego-
tiations with the worker.  In the second scenario, a worker submit-
ted an application directly to Microsoft.  A Microsoft manager then
interviewed the applicant and, if the manager decided that the ap-
plicant was qualified to fill an open position, Microsoft directed the
applicant to sign on with a particular temporary employment
agency.  Once the applicant joined an agency, Microsoft hired the
worker via the agency.  Under this scenario, even contractors who
found positions at Microsoft through their own efforts were never-
theless required to sign up with a temporary employment agency in
order to work at Microsoft.  In both scenarios, after the temporary
employment agency received approval from Microsoft and agreed
to an acceptable wage with a Microsoft representative, a representa-
tive from the temporary employment agency negotiated the terms
of the contract with the worker.  The temporary agency, and not
Microsoft, was the source of benefits available to the temporary
writers and web developers — reflected a variety of skill sets.  van Jaarsveld, supra, note
9, at 365.
47. Microsoft’s Washington State workforce consists of approximately 19,400
workers.  The number of agency contractors has decreased since Microsoft converted
several agency contractor positions to permanent ones, a policy that started in Septem-
ber 1999. See Dan Richman, Microsoft Ends Its Permatemp Era, SEATTLE TIMES, June 30,
2000, at C1.
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agency worker, such as health benefits and training stipends.  In
exchange for these benefits, temporary employment agencies
charge each worker a fee that is deducted from the worker’s
paycheck.48
Once a temporary employment agency found an assignment
for a worker, the temporary employment agency assumed primary
employer responsibilities for the worker and became responsible
for the administration of wages and benefits to that worker.  De-
spite this formal division of responsibilities, however, an examina-
tion of how temporary employment agencies operate reveals that
client firms can nevertheless retain a significant amount of influ-
ence over the terms and conditions of the employment relationship
between the temporary employment agency and the temporary
worker.  Considering the relationship between the client firm and
the temporary employment agency, it would not be unreasonable
to presume that agencies favor the client firm’s interests over those
of the temporary agency workers.
C. The Working Conditions at Microsoft
1. Wage and Benefits Disparity
A wide disparity existed between the wages and benefits of the
agency contractors and those of permanent Microsoft employees.49
Many agency contractors became frustrated by the wages and bene-
fits they received for doing what they perceived as the same work
performed by the permanent Microsoft employees they worked
alongside.  This issue drew the most support from agency contrac-
tors with the longest tenure at Microsoft.  The benefits that accom-
panied a permanent position at Microsoft, in particular the stock
options, convinced many contractors to remain with Microsoft for
extended periods of time in the hope that they would eventually be
hired into permanent positions.  According to one Microsoft man-
ager, the conversion rate of agency contractor status to permanent
employment status was 35%.
When agency contractors complained to their temporary em-
ployment agencies about the disparities in benefits packages, the
48. Gonos, supra note 11.
49. Cynthia Flash, Permanently Temporary and Not Pleased at the Prospect, TACOMA
NEWS TRIB., Feb. 21, 1999, at G1.
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agencies did not respond until Microsoft intervened on the agency
contractors’ behalf and required that temporary employment agen-
cies offer a minimum level of benefits to agency contractors.  In
April 1999, Microsoft established a formal policy that required
agencies to improve the benefits coverage offered to contractors.50
To be considered a “preferred supplier” by Microsoft, a temporary
employment agency was required to provide its workers with the
following benefits: thirteen paid days off per year (including sick
leave, holidays, and vacation); medical and dental insurance, for
which the agency was required to contribute at least half of the cost;
a minimum training stipend of $500 per year; and a retirement sav-
ings program with some matching by the agency.51  The benefits
available, however, excluded stock options.52
2. Lack of Mobility
Temporary staffing agencies describe flexibility as one of the
advantages of being a temporary worker.  Yet these agencies, at the
same time, discouraged some workers from moving to other agen-
cies by including non-compete clauses in their employment agree-
ments.53  A typical non-compete clause used by agencies that
employed Microsoft agency contractors was structured as follows: if
a worker left a temporary employment agency and moved to an-
other temporary agency within six months, the employment agree-
ment required the worker to pay the first agency 35% of the actual
amount the new agency billed to the client firm.  Such non-com-
pete clauses discourage the mobility of agency contractors by deter-
ring movement across agencies, thereby eliminating a key benefit of
these flexible employment arrangements for workers.
One contractor explained the problem this way:
50. Keith Ervin, Microsoft Changes Temp Benefits, SEATTLE TIMES, Apr. 3, 1999, at C8.
51. Richman, supra note 47.
52. Id.
53. Danielle D. van Jaarsveld, Nascent Organizing Initiatives Among High-Skilled
Contingent Workers: The Microsoft-WashTech/CWA Case (2000) (unpublished M.S.
Thesis, Cornell Univ.) (on file with author).  Non-compete clauses are included in con-
tracts when a temporary employment agency actively assists the applicant in finding an
assignment. Id.  According to one agency informant, the agency contract does not in-
clude non-compete language when applicants find their own positions.
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Because of the non-compete clause with [this agency], I
would have to leave Microsoft for six months in order to
change [agencies].  Were it not for that clause, I would
have left this [agency] long ago.  It is probably not in
their powere [sic] but it would be of great benefit if
[Microsoft] could assert some pressure to allow agency
temps more freedom to move from [agency] to [agency]
— not on just a whim but for legitimate reasons.  My ten-
ure here at [Microsoft] is limited because of the [agency]
relationship. I may have to leave [Microsoft] just to get
their hooks out of me.54
If these workers tried to move to a different agency that offered
a better set of benefits, they would risk incuring a monetary penalty
under the terms of the non-compete clauses in their contracts.
3. Secrecy of Bill Rates
Whether an agency contractor approached a temporary em-
ployment agency on his own volition or was directed by Microsoft to
sign up with one, a representative from the temporary employment
agency negotiated the terms of the contract with the worker after
the agency and a Microsoft representative agreed to an acceptable
bill rate — the amount an agency charges a client firm for a
worker’s services.  The agency seeks to maximize its profits by in-
creasing the difference between the bill rate and the pay rate — the
portion of the bill rate that the worker actually receives as gross pay.
The result of this practice is two-fold: some contractors who engage
in similar job activities receive different wages; and a substantial dif-
ference may exist between the bill rate and the pay rate.
During wage negotiations between an agency and a temporary
worker, the agency representative does not disclose the bill rate.55
The difference between the bill rate and the pay rate is information
that temporary employment agencies fight to keep secret.56  Never-
theless, Microsoft’s agency contractors often learned about the dif-
ferentials.  One worker commented, “I’ve also noticed . . .
54. Id.
55. It should be noted that Microsoft cannot be held solely responsible for this
less-than-open negotiation process.  This practice originated with the agencies and ex-
ists among temporary agencies that supply workers to companies in other industries.
56. Gonos, supra note 11.
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disparities, even between contractors in the same group.  In my
group at [Microsoft], we were being paid widely disparate rates,
ranging from $10 to $21/hr, and we were all doing the same
work.”57  Another contractor explained the importance of bill rate
disclosure:
Contractors need to know this info. I think it will force
agencies to tell the truth. We hear all the time how they
don’t make that much of a profit. If we find out exactly
what the mark up is, we can then DEMAND better bene-
fits. This will hipefully [sic] create a healthy competetion
[sic] among agencies. If they are losing all of their em-
ployees to another agency, then they need to change
their benefits/pay package.58
The secrecy surrounding bill rates, along with the frustration
over non-compete clauses, generated dissatisfaction among agency
contractors at Microsoft and eventually generated support for a col-
lective initiative among agency contractors.
4. Break-in-Service Policy
In June 1998, Microsoft introduced a thirty-one-day “break-in-
service” policy, which required new agency contractors, as well as
those who had already worked for Microsoft for twelve consecutive
months, to leave the company for thirty-one consecutive days upon
completing an assignment.59  Company representatives explained
that this policy was necessary to differentiate between permanent
and contingent workers in order to remain in compliance with IRS
guidelines.60  To ensure that contractors could not avoid the thirty-
one day requirement by switching agencies, Microsoft informed
agencies that it would investigate the consecutive assignment his-
tory of workers.61  For agency contractors who were paid only for
the hours they worked, and who were accustomed to starting a new
57. van Jaarsveld, supra note 53.
58. Id.
59. Peter Lewis, Microsoft Makes Its Temps More Temporary, SEATTLE TIMES, Feb. 19,
2000, at B1; Mike Blain, Supreme Court Refuses to Hear Appeal of Microsoft ‘Permatemp’ Settle-
ment, WASHTECH NEWS, Nov. 13, 2002, http://www.washtech.org/news/courts/display.
php?ID_Content=381.
60. See sources cited supra note 59.
61. Blain, supra note 59.
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assignment immediately upon completion of a previous assign-
ment, the introduction of this policy was particularly difficult, and
thereby convinced some of them of the need for collective
representation.
5. Lack of Voice for Workers
In December 1997, the Washington State Department of Labor
and Industries (L&I) enacted the Computer Overtime Exemption
to the Washington Minimum Wage Act, which no longer made it
mandatory to pay overtime to “computer professionals” who earn
more than $27.63 per hour, and created consistency with federal
law.62  Those computer professionals who were covered by a collec-
tive bargaining agreement were unaffected by this change.
Many high-tech professionals were affected by this rule.  Dur-
ing the comment period, L&I received 750 letters and e-mails re-
garding the rule change.63  High-tech contingent workers were the
most vocal opponents of the new rule.  Some of the excerpts from
the protest letters sent to L&I provide insight into the precarious
and vulnerable position of this workforce, which had no one to re-
present the workers’ collective interests:
I’ve worked as a computer systems professional all of my
adult life.  I have never done anything else.  In recent
years, I have had the opportunity to contract for several
major companies (the largest and most well-known) in
the area.  My one, single, only protection against abuse,
exploitation and professional burnout is overtime pay.64
Another contractor wrote:
Microsoft is famous for working its employees long hours.
Like the rest of the software industry, it tends to manage
its projects in crisis mode.  Not long ago a developer in
62. WASH. ADMIN. CODE 296-128-535 (2006). See WASH. ST. DEP’T OF LAB. & IN-
DUS., STATE ADOPTS RULE EXEMPTING COMPUTER PROFESSIONAL OVERTIME PAY RATE
(Dec. 31, 1997), http://www.lni.wa.gov/news/1997/pr971231a.asp [hereinafter WASH.
L&I, STATE ADOPTS RULE] (explaining the reasoning behind adopting the overtime ex-
emption for computer professionals).
63. WASH. L&I, STATE ADOPTS RULE, supra note 62.
64. Letter from Contractor to Mr. Greg Mowat, Program Manager, Employment
Standards, Wash. St. Dep’t of Lab. & Indus., in WASH. L&I, STATE ADOPTS RULE, supra
note 62.
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my building was found dead at his desk.  The ambulance
wasn’t called immediately, because his co-workers just
thought he was asleep.  It’s not unusual for somebody to
be asleep in their offices, having worked all night trying to
make some milestone or other.  The entire company de-
liberately operates in a mode of critical high stress.  In
this atmosphere, is it reasonable to remove the brakes?
What is going to prevent the inevitable abuse?65
Despite the strong worker opposition evident in many letters
and e-mails, L&I enacted the Computer Overtime Exemption to
the Washington Minimum Wage Act.66  The fury generated by this
issue highlighted the absence of a voice for these workers. After
recognizing that their individual efforts failed to prevent the Act
from being enacted, contingent high-tech workers in Washington
State were convinced of the need for an advocacy group to re-
present their interests.  The Computer Overtime Exemption would
prove to have effects beyond just eliminating overtime for a specific
segment of the workforce: it later spurred the workers to take col-
lective action.
6. Second-class Status
Non-economic factors also contributed to the frustration of
Microsoft’s agency contractors.  Microsoft distinguished between its
permanent employees and its contingent workers in several ways
that created a divide within its workforce.  Microsoft assigned
colored identification badges according to employment classifica-
tion: blue badges for permanent employees and orange ones for
contingent workers.67  In addition, Microsoft assigned its agency
contractors e-mail addresses that began with an ‘a’ and a ‘dash,’
65. Letter from Contractor to Mr. Greg Mowat, Program Manager, Employment
Standards, Wash. St. Dep’t of Lab. & Indus. (on file with author).
66. Interestingly, after the L&I ruled that Microsoft was a co-employer of its con-
tingent staff, Washington State Senator Darlene Fairley (D-Shoreline) presented Senate
Bill 6165 to repeal the overtime exemption. See Justin Hopkins, High-Tech Workers Would
Benefit from Bill, SEATTLE TIMES, Jan. 11, 2000, at B1.
67. See Steven Greenhouse, Equal Work, Less-Equal Perks; Microsoft Leads the Way in
Filling Jobs with ‘Permatemps’, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 30, 1998, at D1; Posting of pitr256 to Or-
ange Badges: Contracting at Microsoft, http://orangebadges.com/toast.asp?sub=show
&action=posts&fid=4&tid=3 (Dec. 30, 2005, 15:32).
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fueling the nickname “dash-trash.”68  Microsoft also restricted con-
tingent workers from shopping at the company store for discounted
products, participating in activities on Microsoft sports fields, and
attending morale-building events without special permission.69
While access to the company store or sports fields might sound like
a frivolous request, agency contractors were passionate about such
benefits.
These devices and restrictions symbolized agency contractors’
second-class status, incited anger and resentment, and contributed
to a general sense of disrespect and alienation that agency contrac-
tors experienced in the Microsoft workplace.  Microsoft justified
these measures as necessary to comply with IRS regulations that re-
quire a clear delineation between permanent and contingent
workers.
D. Summary
Although agency contractors at Microsoft might not be “em-
ployees” under the NLRA, they still have labor relations issues,
opinions about working conditions, and an interest in policy
changes that affect their employment.  Yet, as temporary agency
workers, they have limited access to legal remedies.  In addition,
without access to collective bargaining, the problems they faced in
their working environment were not addressed.  The temporary
employment agencies, arguably well situated to represent these
workers, generally remained silent on the many issues affecting the
high-tech contingent workforce, leaving them with four options: 1)
remain on assignment at Microsoft and silently accept the terms of
the employment arrangement; 2) leave Microsoft altogether and
find assignments elsewhere; 3) challenge their working conditions
in the courts;70 or 4) join together in collective action to improve
their working conditions.
68. For example, an agency contractor’s e-mail address would be a-john-
smith@microsoft.com, whereas a permanent employee’s e-mail address would be john-
smith@microsoft.com.  Greenhouse, supra note 67.
69. van Jaarsveld, supra note 9, at 372.
70. The problem with litigation as a strategy, however, is that the courts can be
slow in resolving claims.  It can take years to achieve results and litigation does not
necessarily address all of the issues that might be of interest to contingent workers.  The
former independent contractors who filed suit against Microsoft sought to claim their
\\server05\productn\N\NLR\50-2\NLR214.txt unknown Seq: 19 14-APR-06 7:56
2005-2006] INSIGHTS FROM THE TEMPORARY AGENCY WORKFORCE 373
In March 1998, a group of Microsoft agency contractors chose
the fourth option and formed WashTech/CWA.  This workers’ ad-
vocacy group aimed at establishing an independent voice for con-
tractors in their relationships with temporary employment agencies
and Microsoft, and improving the working conditions for agency
contractors at Microsoft.  WashTech/CWA’s membership consists
of workers who see the fourth option as the most effective strategy
to acquire some countervailing power.  Today, WashTech/CWA ac-
tively advocates on behalf of these agency contractors and others by
providing them with representation.
IV. WASHTECH/CWA: A COLLECTIVE ACTION MODEL FOR
TEMPORARY AGENCY WORKERS
A. Advocacy for Temporary Agency Workers
The temporary agency workforce at Microsoft lacked the tradi-
tional weapons of collective bargaining agreements and work stop-
page, and, therefore, sought representation beyond the NLRA
framework.71  In March 1998, a fledgling advocacy group emerged
from the overtime exemption debacle and evolved into the Wash-
ington Alliance of Technology Workers (WashTech).  The name
WashTech was selected to combine its geographic locale with a ref-
erence to technology — the workers’ chosen profession.  To shield
itself from the negative union image held by many professional
workers, WashTech defined itself as an “alliance” rather than as a
union.  Soon after its formation, WashTech affiliated with the Com-
munication Workers of America (CWA) through the Newspaper
Guild (TNG-CWA) to harness additional resources with which to
share of the benefits — specifically, their exclusion from Microsoft’s Savings Plus Plan
and Microsoft’s Employee Stock Purchase Plan.  They believed these benefits were
owed to them based on the IRS determination that they were common-law employees as
opposed to independent contractors. See Vizcaino, 97 F.3d 1187, modified en banc, 120
F.3d 1006 (9th Cir. 1997), and enforced by mandamus, Vizcaino v. U.S. Dist. Ct., 173 F.3d
713 (9th Cir. 1999).  In December 2001, Vizcaino ended when Microsoft agreed to a
$97-million settlement award to some Microsoft workers involved in the lawsuit.  Rich-
man, supra note 47; see van Jaarsveld, supra note 53.
71. While all of the issues discussed above generated anger among some agency
contractors, the decision to eliminate overtime for computer professionals provided a
direct catalyst for the formation of WashTech/CWA.  van Jaarsveld, supra note 9, at 371.
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challenge Microsoft and the temporary employment agencies.72
WashTech became WashTech/CWA Local 37083 (WashTech/
CWA).73
WashTech/CWA has provided support for contingent workers
and has effectively bypassed the obstacles to temporary agency
worker representation imposed by the NLRA.  In so doing,
WashTech/CWA has achieved some success in addressing the
needs of these workers, including in the areas of benefits and
wages, training opportunities, and representation in the workplace
outside of NLRA-defined procedures.  WashTech/CWA has found
another channel for pressuring client firms by joining a coalition of
advocacy groups that represent a variety of contingent workers
across industries. For example, WashTech/CWA joined the North
Alliance for Fair Employment (NAFFE), an umbrella organization
that includes forty advocacy groups.74  By joining a coalition of ad-
vocacy groups that represents a variety of contingent workers across
industries, WashTech/CWA has found another channel for pressur-
ing employers and pushing for changes in public policy.
WashTech/CWA targets a highly skilled, high-wage workforce
in relation to other contingent workforces outside of the technol-
ogy industry.  Given the wide range of skills and job titles within its
membership, WashTech/CWA’s members are organized along
broad occupational lines and might work in the same workplace,
e.g., at Microsoft or Amazon.com.  WashTech/CWA’s membership
is drawn from technology firms that are concentrated in the Puget
Sound region.  WashTech/CWA also advocates on behalf of a
group that is fairly young in comparison to other occupations.  Al-
though WashTech has only about 450 dues-paying members, 15,000
temporary agency workers subscribe to the organization’s e-mail
list.  WashTech/CWA’s progress on its efforts to represent the high-
tech contingent workforce is limited, mainly by the fact that em-
ployers still refuse to recognize them or bargain with them.  Since
its formation, WashTech/CWA has expanded its membership to in-
72. TNG-CWA seemed a logical partner because of similarities between content
creators for newspapers and content creators for computers, who comprised
WashTech/CWA’s constituency.
73. For further discussion, see van Jaarsveld, supra note 53.
74. David Moberg, Temp Slave Revolt; Contingent Workers of the World Unite, IN THESE
TIMES (Institute for Public Affairs), July 10, 2000, at 11.
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clude permanent workers who have clear access to collective
bargaining.
B. The Traditional Representation Model: A Failed Attempt
WashTech/CWA’s first effort on behalf of agency contractors
at Microsoft was an attempt at a traditional form of collective repre-
sentation.  In April 1999, a group of eighteen Microsoft agency con-
tractors declared themselves a “bargaining unit” in response to the
refusal of their temporary employment agencies’ to improve their
benefits.  The workers were discouraged from changing agencies
due to the non-compete clauses in their employment contracts and
the unspoken agreement among temporary employment agencies
not to talk to workers employed by competitor agencies.  The work-
ers sought help from newly-formed WashTech/CWA.
WashTech/CWA representatives met with the agency contrac-
tors who were representing the so-called bargaining unit to discuss
the situation.  WashTech/CWA informed them of the legal obsta-
cles they faced in gaining collective representation under the NLRA
because of their temporary employment status.  The majority of the
group joined WashTech/CWA and decided to formalize their de-
mands, despite understanding that the NLRA does not require
Microsoft or the temporary employment agencies to negotiate with
them.  WashTech/CWA assisted them in writing a mission state-
ment outlining their bargaining unit’s goals, including: equitable
pay, better benefits, and improved job classifications.75  In addition,
the workers objected to policies that constrained contractors’ ability
to move from project to project, such as the non-compete clause.
Representatives of the bargaining unit met with the temporary em-
ployment agencies that had contracts with group members and dis-
cussed the agency contractors’ concerns, but the temporary
employment agencies were unwilling to negotiate.
While this first effort at collective action was unsuccessful in
getting the temporary employment agencies to directly address the
75. The hierarchy at Microsoft is based on job classification.  These workers
wanted their code-writing abilities reflected in their job classification because that
would translate into higher status at Microsoft.  This particular workgroup, unlike other
workgroups at Microsoft, possessed significant bargaining leverage because they had a
rare combination of skills — a fusion of financial accounting experience and code-
writing skills.
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workers’ concerns, it nevertheless had some effect and resulted in
improved working conditions.  Eventually, Microsoft addressed the
benefits issue and the disparities in pay rates across the group.  Al-
though there must have been some communication between
Microsoft and the agencies regarding the enactment of these
changes, neither the agency contractors nor WashTech/CWA were
invited to the “bargaining table.”
Still unwilling to give up on gaining the ability to choose em-
ployment agencies, the agency contractors devised their own self-
help techniques.  The group developed a method by which they
recruited potential agency contractors for work at Microsoft and
then advised the new recruits about the best temporary employ-
ment agencies with which to contract.  WashTech/CWA was able to
help these workers win some concessions from Microsoft without
the assistance of their primary employers, the temporary employ-
ment agencies.76
C. Success Through Alternative Strategies
Having encountered difficulties in pursuing traditional ap-
proaches, such as collective bargaining units, to bring the tempo-
rary employment agencies to the table, WashTech/CWA pursued
alternative strategies to represent this workforce, including a com-
bination of technology, publicity, training programs, and advocacy
for legislative reform.77  WashTech/CWA used these strategies to
effectively bypass the NLRA requirements for collective representa-
tion and to avoid the legal complications that hampered its initial
attempts to represent temporary agency workers.  In addition, the
assortment of strategies and tactics that WashTech/CWA uses to ad-
vocate on behalf of contingent workers draws attention to the issues
facing contingent workers.78  These strategies, which are imple-
mented through the Internet and the media, enable WashTech/
CWA to pressure employers like Microsoft and temporary employ-
76. Interview with a Microsoft agency contractor, Seattle, Wash. (July 14, 1999).
77. van Jaarsveld, supra note 9.
78. WashTech/CWA recently received a grant from the Ford Foundation to con-
duct a labor market study of the Puget Sound area to help shape the organization’s
direction.
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ment agencies on multiple levels and from several different
directions.79
1. Using Technology to Build Community
“We are using Microsoft’s technology
to organize Microsoft’s workers.”80
WashTech/CWA’s technology strategy consists of two ele-
ments: e-mail and the WashTech/CWA website.  E-mail is primarily
useful as a means of ongoing communication among activists and
temporary agency workers.  WashTech/CWA maintains an e-mail
list of 15,000 registered members to disseminate information about
legislative issues affecting contingent and high-tech workers,
Microsoft policy changes, general industry news, and meetings
about the industry.  Through the use of e-mail, WashTech/CWA
organizers are able to remain in contact with their members and to
keep workers informed about labor and employment developments
that could affect them.  While such reliance on e-mail might be un-
suitable for organizing campaigns among workforces that lack a
high level of computer access, this strategy suits the high-tech
workforce perfectly, given the easy and widespread access to and
usage of computers among this group.
WashTech/CWA’s website allows the organization to maintain
a digital bulletin board where workers can not only discuss issues
they are facing, but also inform WashTech/CWA about develop-
ments in their workplaces.81  WashTech/CWA also uses its website
to collect information from workers through web-based surveys.82
Its website has gained a reputation among high-tech workers as a
source of reliable, current information on Microsoft’s policies, and
has also gained legitimacy with the public at large.
79. The use of multiple strategies is consistent with one of the fundamental princi-
ples underlying the associational unionism model and the citizenship unionism model,
which recommends the use of boycotts, political involvement, and publicity campaigns
to draw public attention to work-related issues.
80. WashTech/CWA uses e-mail and its website, which utilize Microsoft technol-
ogy, for communicating with workers.
81. WashTech News, http://www.washtech.org/news/ (last visited Jan. 21, 2006).
Non-members may view the published material without registering.
82. WashTech Reports, http://www.washtech.org/reports/ (last visited Jan. 21,
2006).
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2. Publicity
Because WashTech/CWA represents contingent workers who
may not have clear access to collective bargaining rights, it must rely
on other sources of leverage.  One critical source of leverage was
large-scale national attention on contingent work — in particular
the press accounts of the situation at Microsoft, including coverage
of Vizcaino, the lawsuit initiated by former independent contractors
at Microsoft to claim lost benefits following the IRS determination
that they were common law employees.83  Through this and other
newsworthy stories, WashTech/CWA has been able to draw atten-
tion to Microsoft’s treatment of contingent workers by using the
pre-existing public interest in Microsoft as not only the most suc-
cessful software company in history, but also one whose anti-com-
petitive practices have angered consumers.  In several cases,
WashTech/CWA broke stories about policy changes at Microsoft by
publishing information on its website, even before Microsoft and
the temporary employment agencies announced the policy
changes.84
WashTech/CWA’s discovery that Microsoft kept secret person-
nel files on agency contractors proved to be the most damaging to
Microsoft as the story played out in the media.  In October 1999,
WashTech/CWA acquired evidence confirming that Microsoft had
maintained a set of secret personnel files since 1995 which docu-
mented the performance of its agency contractors.  Although
Microsoft’s permanent employees could access their personnel files
on the internal Microsoft network, the agency contractors could
not.85  Upon learning about the secret files, WashTech/CWA
agency contractors requested that Microsoft permit them to see
their files.  At first Microsoft refused, claiming that the files did not
exist.  Representatives from Microsoft were quoted by The Seattle
Times as saying, “[w]e do not keep personnel files on employees of
other companies.”86  According to Washington state law, “[e]very
employer shall, at least annually, upon the request of an employee,
83. See Vizcaino, 120 F.3d at 1006.
84. Id.
85. Microsoft Keeps Secret Personnel Files on Contractors, WASHTECH NEWS, Oct. 26,
1999, http://www.washtech.org/news/industry.
86. Jay Greene, Microsoft Kept Files On Temps — Company Contends They Weren’t Per-
sonnel Records, SEATTLE TIMES, Oct. 27, 1999, at C1.
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permit that employee to inspect any or all of his or her own person-
nel file(s).”87  Although temporary employment agencies claimed
to have no previous knowledge about the personnel files, an e-mail
posted to WashTech/CWA’s Electronic Bulletin Board by a former
agency recruiter suggests that the opposite was true.88  The discov-
ery generated an uproar among Microsoft agency contractors, who
were outraged at Microsoft’s actions.
In response, several agency contractors filed complaints with
the wage and hour division of the L&I based on Microsoft’s refusal
to let them see their files.  In January 2000, L&I issued a decision in
favor of the contractors, finding that Microsoft violated the law by
denying agency contractors the right to view the contents of their
files.  In making its determination, L&I stated, “Microsoft is a co-
employer of the contingent or temporary staff workers and that in
view of Microsoft’s co-employer status, these temporary or contin-
gent workers have a right to review performance evaluations and
supervisory comments as bona fide personnel information as pro-
vided for in accordance with Washington State law.”89
The discovery that Microsoft maintained personnel files track-
ing the performance of agency contractors is an example of how
WashTech/CWA played a pivotal role in publicizing Microsoft’s
policies toward contingent workers.  WashTech/CWA orchestrated
a public relations nightmare for Microsoft by posting on its website
an excerpt from the applicable Washington state law and links to
both Microsoft’s Contingent Staffing Group (so that workers could
request access to their files) and to L&I (so that they could file a
complaint if Microsoft denied them access).  This action is one ex-
ample of how WashTech/CWA provided contingent workers with
current information about the legal implications of their employ-
ment status, while at the same time enhancing the workers’ lever-
age in the labor market and the organization’s own reputation.
Once again, representatives from the temporary employment
agencies did not challenge Microsoft’s practice.  WashTech/CWA
has considered starting a worker-run temporary employment
87. WASH. REV. CODE § 49.12.240 (2005).
88. van Jaarsveld, supra note 53.
89. Nan Netherton, Washington State Agency Sees Microsoft as Co-Employer of Temporary
Employees, 19 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) at A–8 (2000).
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agency as a way to compete with temporary employment agencies in
the labor market and to evolve into an alternative labor market in-
termediary.  This idea, however, has not yet reached fruition.
3. Training Programs
Highly-skilled contingent workers need to upgrade their skills
frequently to remain competitive in this rapidly changing industry
and to gain access to better paying positions.  For these reasons,
access to training opportunities is crucial in order to remain com-
petitive in the labor market.  One WashTech/CWA organizer ex-
plained that “[t]he idea of latching onto an organization that will
continue to elevate [workers’] skills is really important.”90
The importance of training to this workforce motivated
WashTech/CWA to establish a regional training center for high-
tech workers in the Seattle area.91  The purpose of the center,
which opened in April 2001, is to provide workers with access to
low-cost technology training on state-of-the-art equipment from
qualified instructors.  WashTech/CWA members receive training at
a discounted rate, whereas non-members pay full price.92  The
training center also supports the CWA’s national training partner-
ship with Cisco Systems, Inc., which provides both computer skills
training and employment referrals.  As a result of the CWA-Cisco
partnership, seven other training facilities now exist throughout the
United States.
4. Legislative Reform
WashTech/CWA has been successful in linking its issues to leg-
islative reform and, as a result, politicians in Washington State are
now paying attention to the issues facing temporary workers.
WashTech/CWA’s first legislative victory was passage of the Contin-
gent Workforce Study Bill by the Washington State Senate.93  The
90. Interview with a WashTech/CWA member, Seattle, Wash. (July 15, 1999)
91. WashTech/CWA to Open New Training Center, Mar. 19, 2001, http://www.
washtech.org/training/031901_announce.php3.
92. The cost of a three-credit course is $1,084 for non-members and $929 for
members.  A non-credit course costs $505 for non-members and $350 for members.
WashTech, Training Classes, http://www.washtech.org/training/current.php (last vis-
ited Feb. 3, 2006).
93. S. J. Res. 8402, 56th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 1999).
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bill created “a bipartisan task force to study Washington’s growing
contingent economy.”94  Washtech/CWA and the Washington La-
bor Council worked together to generate support for the bill.
WashTech/CWA cultivated community support through a letter
writing campaign, phone banks, e-mail, and electronic media.
Efforts by WashTech/CWA organizers to educate legislators
about the issues confronting technology workers have generated
several legislative initiatives.  In January 2000, Washington State
Senator Darlene Fairley revisited the overtime exemption issue,95
which was, in part, the result of efforts by WashTech/CWA or-
ganizers to educate legislators about the issues confronting technol-
ogy workers.  Senator Fairley also sponsored a bill that would
reinstate overtime for computer professionals.96  In addition, a bill
requiring temporary employment agencies to disclose their bill
rates to workers is under consideration by the state legislature.
More recently, WashTech/CWA has received national attention in
the debate about the off-shoring of IT jobs.  Its efforts helped to
motivate the U.S. General Accounting Office to study this
phenomenon.
WashTech/CWA has demonstrated an ability to gain a broader
political base of support by engaging in legislative and public policy
battles and advocating on behalf of high-tech, contingent workers
at the state and federal level.97
D. Challenges Facing WashTech/CWA
Despite its efforts to represent this workforce, WashTech/CWA
now faces the challenge of sustaining an organization with a
94. Id.
95. See Overtime Law Jolts Tech Firms, SEATTLE POST INTELLIGENCER, Mar. 3, 2000, at
E2.  See also discussion supra Part III.C.5.
96. H.R. 6165, 56th Leg., 2nd Sess. (Wash. 1999).
97. While proposals have been submitted at both the federal and state level for
new legislation to address the vulnerability of contingent workers, state-level efforts
have been more successful. See Middleton, supra note 17.  For example, in 2004 Rhode
Island passed the Temporary Workforce Protection Act requiring that temporary work-
ers be given the same benefits as permanent employees and that the temporary workers
must be provided with an accurate estimate of the assignment’s length. See R.I. GEN.
LAWS §§ 28-6.10-1, 28-6.10-3 (2005); Bruce Goldstein, et al., Enforcing Fair Labor Stan-
dards in the Modern American Sweatshop: Rediscovering the Statutory Definition of Employment,
46 UCLA L. REV. 983 (1999).
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broader membership base.  Major challenges include: 1) increasing
their dues-paying membership; 2) Microsoft policy changes aimed
at reducing its vulnerability to WashTech/CWA attacks; 3) a high
level of resistance from high-tech firms; and 4) a high level of resis-
tance to unionization from high-tech workers.
Low membership numbers are related, in part, to a free-rider
problem.  Due to WashTech/CWA’s extensive use of the Internet, a
great deal of the organization’s information is available for free.
WashTech/CWA, therefore, encountered reluctance among work-
ers who frequently visit the WashTech/CWA website to become
dues-paying members.  The organization currently has 451 dues-
paying members, while roughly 15,000 workers subscribe to its e-
mail list.
WashTech/CWA also continues to face resistance to represen-
tation among both high-tech firms and workers.  In contrast to
blue-collar workers, high-tech workers have several characteristics
that suggest they lack both economic and non-economic reasons
for collective action.98  For example, they have higher levels of re-
spect resulting from professional and technical status, a higher de-
gree of individualism and anti-union sentiment, increased levels of
mobility, satisfactory working conditions, and a more significant
amount of individual economic power.
High-tech firms’ resistance to workers seeking collective action
is also a major problem.  High-tech firms have a reputation for be-
ing “one of the most union resistant segments of the American
economy.”99  Microsoft, for example, has initiated policies to re-
duce the number of agency contractors on staff, which suggests that
it does not want unionization to become a common trend among
its contingent workforce.  Amazon.com reacted to a WashTech/
CWA campaign to organize its customer service representatives by
ejecting workers from the lunchroom for distributing WashTech/
CWA literature, distributing information to supervisors about how
to spot organizing activities among workers, and creating an inter-
nal website to describe the firm’s opinion about the impact of col-
98. J. Gregg Robinson & Judith S. McIlwee, Obstacles to Unionization in High-Tech
Industries, 16 WORK & OCCUPATIONS 115 (May 1989).
99. Id.
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lective bargaining on the Amazon.com workforce.100  The
organizing campaign ended abruptly when Amazon laid-off the ma-
jority of the customer service representatives.
V. CONCLUSION
The formation of WashTech/CWA began as an initiative to
challenge employment practices of Microsoft and temporary em-
ployment agencies.  Since then, the organization has evolved, and
today it receives national attention for its efforts to advocate on be-
half of the contingent and IT workforce, regardless of employment
status.
The experiences of agency contractors described in this article
reveal the obstacles that temporary workers encounter, and will
continue to encounter, without clear access to NLRA protections or
the presence of an independent voice representing their interests
in the workplace.  For some unions, such as those in the film and
entertainment industries, representing contingent workers is part
of their reality.101  Other unions, however, have viewed the growth
of the contingent workforce as a threat to their permanent em-
ployee membership.
In the meantime, WashTech/CWA and other union and non-
union organizations across the nation will continue to support and
represent the interests of contingent workers who lack clear access
to collective bargaining.102  The efforts of these organizations sug-
gest that traditional unions need to consider ways to represent such
workers outside of the traditional collective bargaining model.
WashTech/CWA provides a model of some success that challenges
prevailing notions of high-tech workers as impervious to organizing
efforts.103
In the absence of further legal reform, organizations such as
WashTech/CWA are not only necessary to protect contingent work-
100. Interview with Marcus Courtney, President of WashTech/CWA, Ithaca, NY
(Apr. 2001).
101. John Amman, Union and the New Economy: Motion Picture and Television Unions
Offer a Model for New Media Professionals, 6 WORKING USA J. LAB. & SOC’Y 111 (2002).
102. Middleton, supra note 17.
103. Hervey A. Juris & Myron Roomkin, Unions and Collective Bargaining in Manufac-
turing, in THE SHRINKING PERIMETER 197 (Hervey A. Juris & Myron Roomkin eds., 1980);
see also Robinson & McIlwee, supra note 98, at 115-36.
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ers who find it difficult to access workplace protections under cur-
rent U.S. labor and employment laws, but also will become an
increasingly important part of the labor movement.
